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Drug Abuse Control Program Activities In Okinawa B-164031(2)

Department of Defense

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES*

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ABBREVIATIONS

CID Criminal Investigation Division
DAEIS Drug Abuse Education and Information Section
GRI Government of the Ryukyu Islands
HUMRRO Human Resources Research Organization
LPCP Limited Privileged Communication Program
OSI Office of Special Investigations

CHAPTER 1

OKINAWA

GENERAL

Okinawa, which is the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, has an area of 454 square miles and a population of about 800,000. About 48,000 American military personnel were stationed in Okinawa when our review was made during the summer of 1971. Air Force and Marine Corps personnel on Okinawa totaled about 31,000. A part of the study of drug abuse control program activities affecting military personnel discussed in this enclosure to the General Accounting Office report¹ was made primarily at Kadena Air Base and at the 3d Marine Division. The information was obtained by interviewing program management personnel and service members participating in the programs. Additional information was obtained from departmental records.

The Okinawans considered the drug problem as a problem of the American forces until about December 1970 when they began taking greater interest. Although the United States had trained 60 Okinawans in customs inspections, they did not actively look for drugs during their inspections. The situation probably will change when Okinawa reverts to Japan in 1972 and the Japanese seek out and prosecute people carrying unlawful drugs.

AIR FORCE

Twelve thousand of the military personnel on Okinawa were assigned to or were supported by the Air Force's 313th Air Division which has units at Kadena Air Base and Naha Air Base. Fifty percent of these Air Force servicemen were 25 years old or younger, and there were 16,000 Air Force dependents on Okinawa. Because the Naha Air Base was being phased down in preparation for reversion of control of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, our work was done primarily at this base.

¹"Drug Abuse Control Activities Affecting Military Personnel-- Department of Defense" (B-164031 (2), July 1972).

There was only limited information about the extent of the drug problem among Air Force personnel on Okinawa. One source was a questionnaire being given to departing personnel. Through July 1971, the Air Force tabulated 237 such questionnaires. Each question was answered by at least 200 persons, and the results showed that:

1. Five percent had used drugs repeatedly, and 18 percent had used drugs at least experimentally.
2. Forty percent knew someone who used drugs.
3. Forty-two percent estimated that over 10 percent of the airmen in their units used drugs regularly
4. A large majority believed that drug abuse was a problem on Okinawa and in the Air Force, but only 36 percent believed that it was a problem in their units.

Drug abuse councils were established at the Kadena Air Base in early 1969 (and at the Naha Air Base in August 1970) to provide ways and means of educating personnel on the dangers of drug abuse.

MARINE CORPS

Marine Corps forces on Okinawa totaled about 19,200, of these, about 19,000 were on unaccompanied tours. With the exception of those persons who were on 18- or 30-month accompanied tours of duty, the entire Marine population could be expected to change during a 12-month period.

Our review was conducted at the 3d Marine Division which was organized and trained to deploy on short notice anywhere in the Western Pacific area. As of August 31, 1971, there were 13,307 military personnel assigned to this division, 85 percent of whom were 25 years old or younger. About 46 percent of the personnel were 20 years old or younger.

There was only limited information about the extent of the drug problem among Marine personnel on Okinawa. No studies or surveys had been made to determine the nature and the extent of drug abuse.

On July 19, 1971, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed all Marine commands to establish a drug exemption program in accordance with the provisions of SECNAV Instruction 6710.2, dated July 9, 1971. The program provided that members of the Marine Corps who made voluntarily disclosures of illegal or improper use of drugs would, under the terms of the instruction, be granted exemption from disciplinary action and from discharge under other than honorable conditions. The program also provided for the drug abuser to obtain needed medical and psychiatric treatment, counseling, spiritual and moral guidance, and other rehabilitation, if feasible.

A comprehensive Marine drug abuse prevention program was established by division Order 6710.6, dated July 9, 1971. This program consisted of the Drug Abuse Control Council and the Drug Abuse Education and Information Section (DAEIS). In addition, there were concurrent efforts to prevent drugs from entering Okinawa and to identify the drug pusher and the drug user by (1) law enforcement and division personnel and (2) the urinalysis-testing program.

CHAPTER 2

AIR FORCE

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG SUPPRESSION

Law enforcement efforts were undertaken by the Kadena Air Base Security Police, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the Armed Forces Police, and the Staff Judge Advocate.

Kadena Air Base Security Police

Since May 1971, the Kadena Air Base Security Police have inspected incoming aircraft as their primary effort to control drug abuse. Teams consisting of 10 permanently assigned men and 12 men on call search all military aircraft passengers and baggage arriving at Kadena--except from the United States and Japan--and all outgoing and passenger carry-on baggage, at an estimated annual cost of \$113,000. Since the inspection began, the team has made only one significant find--in June 1971 two unclaimed bags containing 19 pounds of marihuana, 59 grams of hashish, 39 grams of heroin and morphine, and 220 grams of barbiturates.

OSI

OSI had 27 agents on Okinawa who were coordinated with the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) Police and the Armed Forces Police. The number of drug investigations undertaken by OSI were as follows.

<u>Calendar year</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>
1968	118
1969	139
1970	150
1971 (1st quarter)	34

Armed Forces Police

The Armed Forces Police on Okinawa was a joint service police force commanded by the Provost Marshal, U S Army, Ryukyu Islands. The commander of the U.S Armed Forces Police stated that coordination with GRI was excellent.

The Armed Forces Police participated in a task force, which began operation in July 1971, and included GRI Police and agents from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice. The purpose of the task force was to control the influx and use of drugs on Okinawa. The task force's main objective was to break up a ring of discharged military men who had returned to Okinawa (referred to as passport civilians) and who were dealing in drugs. The total cost of operating the task force, which was to have been dissolved on December 31, 1971, was estimated at \$38,000, exclusive of costs applicable to agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

The number of Air Force personnel on Okinawa investigated by the Armed Forces Police over the past 3 fiscal years had more than doubled. Most offenders were charged with possession, principally possession of marihuana. However, heroin was involved in seven instances during fiscal year 1971 compared to one instance in fiscal year 1969. With few exceptions, the offenders charged were in grades E-4 or lower, in fiscal year 1971 more than 25 percent of offenders charged were Air Force dependents.

Staff Judge Advocate

Information on courts-martial and nonjudicial punishments for drug involvement (i.e., possession or use) by Kadena Air Base personnel under Article 15: Uniform Code of Military Justice follows.

<u>Period</u>	<u>Disciplinary level</u>	<u>Punishment</u>
Jan. 1, 1970, to June 1, 1971	Courts-martial: General (2)	Dishonorable discharge (1) Bad conduct discharge (1)
	Special (7)	Acquittals (4) Fines, rank reduction, and/or confinement (3)
Jan. 1969 to June 1971	Article 15 (66)	Fines, rank reduction, and/or confinement (65) Reprimand (1)

Administrative discharges

From February 1970 through June 1971, 32 Air Force enlisted men on Okinawa were administratively discharged for drug abuse. All but two received general discharges under honorable conditions, those two were given undesirable discharges. Neither of the men who received an undesirable discharge had participated in the Air Force's Limited Privileged Communication Program (LPCP). (See p. 13.)

Effectiveness of law enforcement activities

Available statistics show that increasing numbers of drug abuse cases were investigated and that abusers were discharged, fined, reduced in rank, and placed in confinement. This increase in activity was expected to deter the drug experimenter or the person who has not tried drugs.

Federal law classifies marihuana as a narcotic. To have, give, or sell marihuana in the United States is a felony with a penalty of 2 to 10 years' imprisonment for the first offense. The severity of such a law is difficult for some people to understand when the effects of marihuana are compared to the effects of alcohol, the use of which is legal.

There was a possibility, expressed to us by several sources, that the increased law enforcement efforts had reduced the supply of marihuana and had induced marihuana smokers to switch to heroin. The commander of the Armed Forces Police stated that recently the percentage of drug investigations involving heroin had increased from less than 1 percent to over 30 percent, and that the price of marihuana in Okinawa had risen from \$40 a pound to \$150 a pound, as a result of its scarcity

A Staff Judge Advocate official stated that he did not know whether marihuana should be legalized but that he would not report any man he saw smoking it, because he saw nothing wrong with it. A base medical services official stated that the evidence he had seen tended to prove that the use of marihuana should be legalized. He said that no harmful effects had been proven, that no deaths had resulted, and that no facts in favor of keeping it illegal had been produced.

Of 35 people interviewed by questionnaire, 23 felt that present law enforcement was not very effective in preventing drug abuse. There was a distinct difference in attitudes toward the drug user and the drug pusher. Thirty-three of the interviewees felt that the drug pusher should be court-martialed, whereas 29 felt that the drug user should be rehabilitated or should receive only nonjudicial punishment.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Installation commanders were responsible for developing and conducting educational programs for military personnel. The Kadena Air Base Drug Abuse Council advised the commander on ways and means to educate personnel about the dangers of drugs.

Absence of information about the extent and causes of drug abuse made it difficult to develop effective methods to reach the user and prospective user of drugs. Locally there had been no comprehensive surveys or analyses to determine the characteristics, knowledge, or attitudes of Air Force personnel on Okinawa for whom drug abuse education was intended. The Kadena Air Base was not included in the Department of Defense servicewide drug survey which was being conducted under contract by the Human Resources Research Organization (HUMRRO) among 40,000 enlisted personnel at selected military commands throughout the world.

Methods used to teach airmen about drug abuse were (1) drug abuse workshops, (2) briefings by a drug abuse team, (3) newcomers' briefings, (4) squadron briefings, and (5) radio, television, and newspaper messages.

Drug abuse workshops--One-day drug abuse workshops were established by the Kadena Air Base Drug Abuse Council in February 1971 to provide information about drugs and to improve communication with the young airmen. These workshops consisted of medical, legal, moral, and religious lectures, and group participation activities. They were held in an informal atmosphere with attendees wearing civilian clothing, and workshop leaders gave assurances that sensitive matters discussed by the participants would not be disclosed. Workshops held in April, June, and August 1971 were attended by 125 participants.

Workshop leaders did not have a formal course outline or lesson plan. They based their lectures on information gained from their day-to-day associations with the drug problem and from personal studies. One lecturer stated that he had been able to use several articles from Playboy Magazine. The Commander, 313th Air Division, informed us that having the Air Force prepare uniform educational presentations

would eliminate the possibility of lecturers' interjecting their personal views

Practically all workshop participants felt that they had benefited. We attended one workshop and felt that it succeeded in imparting knowledge about drugs and stimulating thought, as well as bringing out grievances of the young airmen. However, no conclusions or solutions to the problem were reached. One workshop was scheduled each month, and, on the average, only 42 people attended each workshop. Regardless of the benefit which the individual may derive, at this rate the workshop will not reach a significant part of the Kadena Air Base military population of 11,000.

The 5th Air Force--parent organization of the 313th Air Division--informed the division on August 11, 1971, that under no circumstances would drug abuse workshops be held with participants wearing civilian clothes without nametags. The 5th Air Force directed that central base funds not be used for furnishing refreshments at these workshops.

Drug abuse team briefings--The Kadena Air Base had a drug abuse lecture team made up of an OSI agent, a doctor, a lawyer, and a chaplain. Lectures would be given when requested by organizations, and this was not limited to Air Force organizations. During fiscal year 1971, 34 such briefings were given. The lectures essentially were the same as those given at the newcomers' briefings.

Newcomers' briefings--These briefings were started in July 1971, and two were planned for each month for personnel newly assigned to the division. We attended an orientation briefing in a cold and dark theater. Many people appeared to be asleep, and most people seemed relieved when the briefing was over. In August 1971 the base commander stated that only 35 percent of the newcomers were attending the briefings.

Squadron briefings (commander's call)--Individual squadrons on Kadena were providing drug abuse education through films, talks, and handouts. Because there was a lack of reports, it was difficult to measure effectiveness, however, reports that were received showed that 2,647 people had received drug abuse briefings in December 1970 and January 1971.

Radio, television, and newspaper messages--Spot drug announcements were broadcast on Okinawa by military stations--one television, one FM (frequency modulation) radio, and two AM (amplitude modification) radio stations. During the period January through July 1971, there were 241 television spots, 169 FM spots, and 814 AM spots

Full-length television shows about drug abuse were also shown. Some of these were stories on regular series, such as "Mission Impossible," "Ironside," and "Mod Squad." During 1971 six shows a month were televised.

The Kadena Air Base weekly newspaper, the Kadena Falcon, published 18 articles on drug abuse between January and August 1971. The articles discussed the legal and medical aspects of drug abuse and explained Air Force policy on handling the drug problem. Five thousand copies of the newspaper were distributed weekly, which averaged one newspaper for every four or five persons on the base

Resources for drug education program

The Kadena Air Base had received no additional resources from the Air Force for drug abuse education. Personnel conducting the lectures and workshops had other full-time assignments. Therefore, any measurement of the cost of conducting the program would be based, in part, on arbitrary cost allocations.

Effectiveness of education programs

There was no evaluation of the effectiveness of drug abuse education. Participants filled out questionnaires which asked for opinions on what had been learned and what could be done to improve the workshop, and military personnel departing Okinawa were questioned on the drug problem.

We interviewed, by questionnaire, 35 people at Kadena, who had a rank of airmen to colonel, to determine their attitudes toward the drug abuse educational efforts of the Air Force. Following are the answers given by the interviewees.

<u>What drug abuse educational programs have you attended?</u>	<u>Number of replies</u>
Commander's call and basic lecture	23
Drug abuse workshop	18
Other	5
Orientation briefing	3
None	1

<u>Did you think the instruction was factual?</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Drug abuse workshop	18	-
Commander's call and basic lecture	7	6
Orientation briefing	3	3
Others	3	-

<u>Factors cited as effective</u>	<u>Times cited</u>
Drug abuse workshops	
Group discussion	9
Civilian clothes	8
Communication	6
Lectures	6
Presence of addicts	5
"Jesus movement"	2
Questions and answers	2
Other programs:	
Discussions	5
Films	4
Marihuana dog demonstration	3
Lectures	2
Newspaper articles	1

<u>Factors cited as ineffective</u>	
Drug abuse workshop	
Group discussion	9
Presence of addicts	1
Too many "lifers"	1
"Jesus movement"	1

Other programs	
Lack of information	7
Lectures	4
Weak communication	2
Films and reading material	2
Emphasis on statistics	1

How do you think the program could
be improved?

Number of replies

Drug abuse workshops	
Better organization	7
Lengthen program	6
Presence of more noncommissioned officers	2
Reach more people	2
Eliminate "Jesus movement"	1
Add films	1
Separate airmen and noncommissioned officers	1
Other programs	
Lengthen program	4
More discussion	4
Improve relations	3
Better instruction	3
More lectures	2
More films	2
More information	1
More marihuana dog demonstrations	1

Twenty-four of the 35 people interviewed felt that their answers would be similar to that of their peers. The others did not think so or they were uncertain.

IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG USERS

The urinalysis-testing program for identifying drug users had not been started by the Air Force on Okinawa at the time of our review. It was scheduled to start on November 1, 1971. Identification of personnel involved with drugs was limited, therefore, to volunteers in LPCP and to people identified by result of investigations.

AMNESTY PROGRAM, LPCP, AND EXEMPTION PROGRAM

Air Force personnel who volunteered under LPCP to an immediate commander or to Air Force medical personnel were assured that information volunteered would not be used in Uniform Code of Military Justice actions or to support a less than honorable discharge. A person's volunteering initially to a doctor must be reported to his unit commander. Volunteered information may be used to remove persons from flight status or from human-reliability assignment, to deny them security clearance, and to reassign, investigate, or discharge them under honorable conditions. Medical assistance and rehabilitation were made available to military personnel seeking help on drug use problems. No extra money or manpower have been made available to Air Force medical personnel on Okinawa.

By message of March 19, 1971, the 313th Air Division described the program and directed commanders to insure that all personnel were thoroughly briefed. The program was advertised to airmen through commanders' calls, the Daily Bulletin, and the base newspaper.

We interviewed several responsible officers to determine their attitudes toward LPCP. Examples of their remarks follow.

The Chairman of the Kadena Drug Abuse Council stated that airmen did not trust the program because it could lead to administrative discharge, loss of security clearance, or removal from a specialty field. He felt that the program needed to be better advertised to explain why it had the punitive provisions. He felt also that the administrative discharge provision was scaring off men who wanted to stay in the Air Force.

The Vice Commander, 313th Air Division, felt that the program was good but that the provision allowing administrative discharge should be deleted.

A Staff Judge Advocate official stated that the program was worthless and that the Air Force did not know whether it was trying to treat a social problem or a criminal problem. He said that the present program was only for those people who wanted to get out of the service.

A base medical services official said that the program was not working because the troops did not trust it and that the Air Force did not believe in amnesty

The Kadena Dispensary Flight Surgeon said the airmen did not trust the program. He stated that removal of the restrictions and more leeway to doctors about reporting men to their commanders would improve the program

A psychiatrist said that the program was a farce and that people did not trust it because, in the past, admitted drug users had been made to inform on their buddies. He said that, to improve the program, physicians needed to make the decisions on whether a person should be reported to his commander. He stated also that higher commands had deluded themselves into thinking there was no problem because of the few men who had entered the program

Of the 35 persons interviewed by questionnaire, 29 had heard of the program. The six persons who had not heard of the program were in grades E-3 and E-4. Fifteen persons were not aware of the implications or important provisions of the program, 18 felt that airmen did not trust the program, and nine did not know whether it was credible. Only three felt that the program was credible.

Through August 1971, 13 Air Force personnel on Okinawa had entered LPCP. Following is a breakdown of the disposition of those cases.

Received administrative discharge after refusing treatment	8
Evacuated	2
Treatment pending	2
Refused treatment, separation pending	<u>1</u>
	<u>13</u>

Servicemen and responsible officers indicated to us that the program was not acceptable to persons who wanted Air Force careers or who desired to maintain their reputations.

We questioned three men who had entered LPCP on Okinawa. Those three said that they had used drugs prior to joining the Air Force and had received at least a little education on drugs but that the drug lectures they had attended were not very credible. They believed that instruction should begin at an early stage and that scare tactics should not be used. They also felt that older people should be better educated to understand the drug problem.

The three entered the program for different reasons. One volunteered for the program because he was working with nuclear material and felt that he should not be working at his assigned position, a second turned himself in because he felt that he was using drugs for the wrong reason, and the third turned himself in at the suggestion of a psychiatrist who was treating him for personality problems.

None of the three had been subjected to harrassment after entering the program, although one reported that personnel in his unit were leery of him. Another, who was seeing a psychiatrist, stated that some of the personnel were rude and obnoxious to him.

There were no Air Force facilities on Okinawa for long-term rehabilitation of drug users who required hospitalization. Evacuation cases were being sent to Lackland Air Force Base, Tex., for treatment.

OBSERVATIONS

Although the Kadena Air Base Drug Abuse Council was formed in early 1969, education efforts of the council may have been hampered by lack of funds and people. Educational programs have been funded from existing resources. Teaching materials and methods have been developed by individual lecturers on the basis of information gathered from their day-to-day associations with the drug problem and from personal studies.

The method of education considered by Air Force personnel interviewed as being most effective--the 1-day workshop--probably will reach only a small percentage of the base population. Furthermore, restrictions were being imposed which could hamper the effectiveness of the workshop. The 5th Air Force required that all participants be identified, even though anonymity enhances a free exchange of information, and directed that central base funds not be used for furnishing workshop refreshments.

There was a lack of information on the extent and nature of the drug abuse problem--i.e., the incidence of drug use according to age group or rank, frequency of use, types of drugs, and reasons for use. Unless there is a good definition of the problem, any sizable amount of money spent on education may be misdirected

According to a number of sources, LPCP on Okinawa was being used by airmen primarily in an attempt to get out of the Air Force. Only four of the 13 who had volunteered for assistance under the program appeared to desire help in solving their drug problem. The possible adverse actions that can take place if one volunteers for the program is believed to be a factor limiting the number of drug users who will volunteer. The principal means of identifying drug users will therefore be involuntary ones--investigations and the upcoming urinalysis-testing program.

Increased law enforcement efforts on Okinawa were expected to deter the drug experimenter or the person who had not tried drugs. There was a probability, however, that these efforts had decreased the supply of marihuana and had caused marihuana users to switch to heroin. If this is

true, Air Force officials are faced with a dilemma. Given the legal sanctions against marihuana, the officials cannot condone its use. They have little alternative other than mounting aggressive drug suppression and law enforcement activities. By cracking down on marihuana, they may indirectly be contributing to a worse problem.

CHAPTER 3

MARINE CORPS

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG SUPPRESSION

These efforts were undertaken by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Marine Corps Law Center, Armed Forces Police, and individual commanders

CID

CID was responsible for investigating drug incidents on Marine bases. CID coordinated its effort with the effort of the Armed Forces Police that investigate crimes committed off base. CID also worked in close contact with GRI Police. It kept local police informed about its activities, and the Ryukyans informed CID of their efforts. CID officials indicated that much of the drug traffic involved Ryukyans and American "passport civilians." GRI was responsible for apprehending these civilians, and, according to CID personnel, GRI efficiency was questionable.

There were 14 CID investigators who handled drug abuse cases. eight were school-trained American investigators, three were Americans who had received on-the-job training, and three were Ryukyuan investigators. These men also investigated other crimes. There were no statistics on how much time they spent investigating drug abuse incidents. CID's efforts to control drug abuse were part of its overall investigative effort. There were cost figures on the overall effort but not on drug abuse control.

CID used several methods to control drug abuse. At the time of our review, it had 50 to 60 informers to inform it about suspected drug incidents and to make controlled purchases of drugs. Also, marihuana-detecting dogs have been used by the Marines since August 1, 1970, for unannounced searches at the gates to the Marine bases and for searches of the barracks. Between November 1970 and September 1971, 161 searches were made which resulted in 249 finds. CID personnel felt that marihuana-detecting dogs also were effective from a psychological standpoint.

Between January 1970 and September 1971, CID investigated 1,232 drug incidents in the division. Over a thousand of these incidents involved marihuana, 150 involved dangerous drugs, and 60 involved narcotics. Information on whether the investigations were for drug use, drug addiction, or selling of drugs was not available.

During the period February through September 1971, 548 marines were apprehended for drug abuse violations. There were 419 marines from the division apprehended for violations involving marihuana, 67 for violations involving dangerous drugs, and 52 for violations involving narcotics.

CID personnel were searching 25 percent of the marines returning with battalion landing teams from sea duty. These searches revealed small quantities of dangerous drugs and narcotics.

CID officials confirmed the fact that heroin use was increasing. Several low-ranking marines who used drugs felt that the increased use of heroin resulted from the crackdown on marihuana.

Law Center

Statistics on courts-martial were maintained officially for only 90 days at the division. After 90 days they were sent to the Marine Headquarters, Washington, D C. However, the Law Center did have statistics on the number of courts-martial from January 1970 to August 15, 1971, as shown in the following table.

	<u>General courts- martial</u>	<u>Special courts- martial</u>	<u>Summary courts- martial</u>	<u>Article 15 punishment</u>
Jan to Dec 1970	1	56	26	98
Jan to Aug 1971	<u>1</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>111</u>
Total	<u>2</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>209</u>

The two general courts-martial resulted in bad conduct discharges. In 1970, nine bad conduct discharges resulted from the 56 special courts-martial. In 1971, two bad conduct

discharges resulted from 21 special courts-martial. According to Marine Corps Law Center officials, courts-martial rarely were held for drug offenses only. Usually there were other charges involved, and it was difficult to determine how much of the sentence could be attributed to the drug charge.

Sentences varied from case to case, and there was no way of comparing the sentences. There was a noticeable trend to dispose of marijuana cases by summary courts-martial at which the battalion commander was the lawyer, prosecutor, and judge. Maximum punishment was limited to confinement at hard labor for 30 days and a one-level reduction in pay grade. This punishment was less severe than the possible punishment under special and general courts-martial.

Administrative discharges

From January 1970 to August 15, 1971, 465 marines were administratively discharged for drug abuse, as shown in the following table.

	<u>Administrative Discharges</u>		
	<u>Honorable</u>	<u>General</u>	<u>Undesirable</u>
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1970	5	46	107
Jan. 1 to Aug. 15, 1971	<u>5</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>199</u>
Total	<u>10</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>306</u>

Detailed information on the above discharges was not available.

Effectiveness of law enforcement

Available statistics showed that increasing numbers of drug abuse cases were being investigated and that abusers were being discharged, restricted, fined, reduced in rank, and placed in confinement. Also there was a marked increase in heroin use.

We interviewed 39 people about their views on law enforcement. Nineteen people indicated that law enforcement

was not effective in preventing drug abuse, and eight felt that law enforcement had some effect in preventing drug abuse. The majority of officers and staff noncommissioned officers favored stricter law enforcement. However, the majority of enlisted men did not think strict law enforcement could reduce drug abuse.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Information on the extent of the drug abuse problem among marines was not available. No definitive surveys or analyses were made which would determine the characteristics, knowledge, or attitudes of marines stationed on Okinawa. A total of 986 marines in the 3d Division were surveyed by HUMRRO, under a contract with the Department of Defense to conduct a worldwide, servicewide drug use survey among a random sample of 40,000 enlisted personnel at selected military commands.¹ The answer sheets prepared by these marines were forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on October 6, 1971.

The division's Drug Abuse Control Council and DAEIS were the two organizations engaged in monitoring, developing, and conducting education programs for the 3d Marine Division personnel.

Division Drug Abuse Council

The Drug Abuse Control Council was established on July 9, 1971, in an attempt to deal with the drug abuse problem. The council membership included representatives from the commanding general's staff and the division law enforcement office and legal, medical, and clerical personnel. The council, which met monthly, (1) monitored and determined the adequacy of all programs designed to combat drug abuse, (2) promoted coordinated effort with other military commands on Okinawa to suppress the supply of dangerous drugs and narcotics, and (3) formulated plans and instructions to implement the commanding general's policies and decisions on drug abuse.

DAEIS

DAEIS was established on January 19, 1971, and it organized two teams to present authoritative and professional

¹Report by the contractor was expected to be made early in 1972.

educational programs to all division personnel. DAEIS collected and maintained source material, studies, reports, publications, brochures, handouts, movies, and publicity material and served as a reference depository. It also provided technical and material assistance upon request and disseminated information and publicity pertaining to drug abuse to all units within the division.

The drug abuse teams developed two distinct educational presentations. The one for enlisted personnel (E-5 and below) entitled "Drug Abuse - Its Consequences" consisted of a 2-hour presentation on medical aspects and legal consequences of drug abuse. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers were given a 2-hour presentation entitled "Drug Abuse and the Leader" and an informational handout on drug abuse. All personnel of the division were required to attend the drug presentation a minimum of once every 6 months. These presentations were given on request in an effort to assist the unit commanders in drug education within their commands. From January through September 1971, 149 presentations were given and were attended by 9,171 persons.

The lesson plans prepared and utilized by DAEIS were designed to provide factual information, without the use of scare techniques, on the physical dangers encountered with drugs and the legal and punitive consequences of drug abuse.

The medical instructions given to young enlisted marines (E-5s and below) and officers and staff noncommissioned officers (E-6s and above) essentially were the same. The presentation included a simple history of drugs, including alcohol, how they can be used medically or how they can be abused, and the physical and psychological effects of their use. Also, the officers and the staff noncommissioned officers were given advice on how to detect drug users.

The legal instructions given to the two groups were quite different. Young enlisted marines were told of the consequences of violating Federal, military, and certain foreign laws. They were also told about the Exemption Program. (See p. 27.) The officers and staff noncommissioned officers were told of the current military, Federal, and Japanese laws affecting the drug abusers and of the proper search-and-seizure procedures for obtaining illegally possessed dangerous drugs, narcotics, and marihuana.

Other educational efforts

The officer in charge of DAEIS briefed all newly arrived division officers and staff noncommissioned officers on the local "drug scene" and on the division drug program. Newly arrived enlisted men (E-5 and below) were similarly briefed by the division headquarters battalion. During the period January through September 1971, DAEIS gave 35 orientation briefings which were attended by 1,300 persons. Unit commanders conducted weekly training programs for enlisted personnel. Also DAEIS maintained an updated list of training films related to drug abuse, and all unit commanders were required to show one of these films each quarter. In addition, unit chaplains discussed the moral aspects of drug abuse in the division moral guidance program.

One television station, one FM radio station, and two AM radio stations broadcast spot drug announcements. From January through July 1971, there were 241 television spots, 169 FM spots, and 814 AM spots. Full-length television shows related to drug abuse were also shown. Some of these were stories on regular series, such as "Mission Impossible," "Ironside," and "Mod Squad." During 1971, six shows a month were televised.

The Marine Corps weekly newspaper, the Okinawa Marine, published articles on drug abuse. The articles discussed the legal and medical aspects of drug abuse and explained Marine Corps policy on handling the drug problem. The newspaper had a weekly circulation of 7,500 or one newspaper for every two or three marines on Okinawa.

Evaluations of effectiveness of division educational activities

There was no overall evaluation of the effectiveness of drug education. Personnel who attended presentations filled out critiques and rated the instruction good, fair, or poor. We reviewed critiques for two enlisted personnel classes and two officer and staff noncommissioned officer classes. All 35 officer and staff noncommissioned officers rated the instruction good, however, 22, or 40 percent, of the enlisted personnel rated the instruction fair and 33, or 60 percent, rated it good.

We interviewed 18 persons, including younger enlisted men, staff noncommissioned officers, company-grade officers, and field-grade officers, to determine how credible they thought the educational program was and how it could be improved. Only one person had not received any education on drug abuse. Fourteen felt that the instruction was credible. Five persons believed that the program could be improved if it was taught by former drug users.

We also interviewed 11 persons in the exemption and rehabilitation programs and found that seven had received drug abuse education consisting of movies, slides, and lectures before using drugs and seven persons had received drug abuse education before entering the exemption and rehabilitation programs. We asked four persons what they believed was particularly effective about the instruction. Three felt that the instruction scared people away from drugs and consequently had a good effect and one believed that the instruction was particularly effective. However, five persons felt that the instruction was not credible. In general, these persons believed that the instruction could be improved by presenting more factual information and by using former drug users in the educational program.

Resources for drug education program

Cost information for education facilities, supplies, and materials was not readily available. The estimated yearly personnel cost of administering DAEIS was \$62,000. Funds had not been directly made available from higher headquarters for the drug abuse program, to date, facilities, supplies, materials, and personnel had been made available from division in-house resources.

IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG USERS

On August 15, 1971, the division initiated a urinalysis-testing program for identifying drug abusers. The Camp Hansen Dispensary is the central urine collection and processing unit for the division. The samples were sent to the Navy Drug Screening Laboratory, Naval Hospital, Oakland, Calif , for analysis. From August 15 to September 30, 1971, 1,613 division personnel were tested and only four were found to have positive results.

The four marines found to be positive had already departed from Okinawa when the dispensary was notified by the Naval Hospital, Oakland. The dispensary notified the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the four marines were no longer on Okinawa.

Controls over handling and shipping of samples were adequate. However, it was not possible to determine conclusively that the sample taken was that of the military member. The commanding general recognized this fact and informed us that procedures would be revised to correct this deficiency.

At that time the Navy Drug Screening Laboratory notified the dispensary by message only about persons who tested positive. If the message was lost, the dispensary would record the man as having been tested negative. Also this problem was recognized, and a recommendation was made to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, to send "negative reports on lots of samples, with specified exceptions." At the time of our review, no response had been received.

Drug abusers were also being identified under the exemption program and as a result of investigations.

AMNESTY PROGRAM, LPCP, AND EXEMPTION PROGRAM

The Marine Corps Exemption Program for voluntary disclosures of drug possession and use was established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on July 19, 1971, in response to SECNAV Instruction 6710.2 dated July 9, 1971. The program's purpose was to enable a drug user or possessor to obtain needed medical and other rehabilitative help without fear of disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or without fear of separation from the service with a discharge under other than honorable conditions. The program, however, did not preclude modifying security clearances, duty assignments, flight statuses or other personnel or administrative actions, nor did it preclude investigating criminal activity. Exemption under this program was to be granted only once and for only those instances in which the member voluntarily disclosed his use of drugs.

Members requesting exemption were not required to identify other drug abusers in order to obtain exemption; however, a member may be required to testify about drug activities before an official board of investigation, court-martial, or other such body after being granted exemption. The program provided for the member to receive a medical examination and treatment at the command level or at U.S. Navy drug rehabilitation centers, including psychiatric evaluation and spiritual and moral assistance. Commanding officers were required to designate one or more Exemption Program representatives for their commands.

By July 30, 1971, all Marine units on Okinawa had appointed exemption officers, and on August 3, 1971, the first marine entered the program. As of September 30, 1971, 130 marines had been granted exemption.

We reviewed battalion reports on 99 exemptees and summarized the information available as of September 30, 1971.

<u>Status</u>	<u>Number of exemptees</u>
Investigation underway	22
Discharge in process	16
Awaiting division discharge approval	16
No information	15
Violated exemption	7
On duty	7
Awaiting medical evacuation	6
Medically evacuated	4
Rotated--no information	2
Awaiting process of prior case	2
Discharge approved	1
Confined to brig--awaiting sentence	<u>1</u>
	<u>99</u>

The seven persons who violated exemption were no longer in the program and were subject to criminal prosecution. No information was available on the four medically evacuated persons because their personnel records were forwarded to their new location.

We interviewed 11 marines who had been granted exemption. All believed that the treatment and the rehabilitation received under the program were less than adequate and consequently felt that the program was a letdown. However, three of the 11 program volunteers admitted that they wanted to be discharged or to get out of the service.

The division Operations Analysis Branch made a drug exemption study to formulate a realistic profile of the drug exemptee. It found that within the division the exemptee tended to be a nonrated marine under the age of 20, with slightly less than 2 years experience in the Marine Corps. He was generally a product of a broken home and had a history of trouble with school officials and the law in general. His education level was significantly less, from a statistical standpoint, than that of other enlisted marines in the division, but his level of intelligence was the same. He had been using drugs for almost 3 years, from about the age of 17. In almost every case he began using drugs before coming to Okinawa. Sixty-nine percent of the 64 marines studied began using drugs before entering the Marine Corps,

and 25 percent began after entering but before reporting to the division. Only four of the persons claimed to have started using drugs after reporting to the division.

Locally, the publicity given to the Exemption Program seemed adequate. All persons interviewed knew of the drug Exemption Program, however, not all thought that it was credible. Of 33 persons interviewed, 21 felt that enlisted men did not trust the Exemption Program and only two believed that the program was trustworthy. The remaining persons interviewed had mixed feelings about the program.

Most officers felt that the enlisted men had decided what they thought about the program, but were waiting to see what would happen to the individuals who currently were being processed. The officers thought that most young enlisted men felt that the program was not trustworthy and that troops feared the consequences of admitting drug abuse. One officer said that enlisted men felt that the program was a trap.

DETOXIFICATION, TREATMENT, AND REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation was considered a big problem because of a lack of (1) medical and psychiatric personnel, (2) trained rehabilitative personnel, and (3) adequate facilities.

There were inadequate staff and facilities on Okinawa for retaining former drug users while they were being processed. The Camp Kue Army Hospital was the only environment considered drug free, and because of space and staff restrictions, it admitted drug patients for 5 days. Disposition instructions for medical evacuations of drug patients had to come from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Because of the remoteness of Okinawa, the waiting period for these instructions was 7 or more days. At the time of our review, there were three former drug users in the division who had been to Camp Kue Army Hospital and were back in their unit--not a drug-free environment--awaiting disposition, because dispensary officials had been informed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps that stateside service hospitals were full.

Medical personnel on Okinawa informed us that rehabilitation of drug users would be difficult, if not impossible. In their view, drug abuse was caused by emotional and psychological problems, and the drug user usually had a character disorder developed early in life which may be impossible to correct. He was usually a school dropout, a troublemaker, and was usually in conflict with society. According to the division psychiatrist, it was most difficult to rehabilitate someone who was at odds with society.

The division psychiatrist did not have the time to meet every drug user. Medical personnel performing medical examinations screened exemptees and recommended a psychiatric evaluation for only those persons who appeared to be physically or psychologically addicted.

Division rehabilitation resources were austere. Rehabilitation was nonclinical and was conducted at the unit level, except in those cases in which medical evacuation was necessary. The unit's program stressed changing one's attitudes and instilling human values.

Operations Analysis personnel recommended to the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, that centralized processing and rehabilitation be established in order to:

1. Remove the administrative burden from the individual units.
2. Remove rehabilitation efforts from individual units, most of which were untrained and ill-equipped to perform this function.
3. Maximize uniformity and streamlining of the administrative procedures.
4. Remove drug users from the units, where they constituted a detriment to the morale and overall performance of the unit.

Harassment

Exemptees felt that they were subjected to some form of harassment and personal degradation. Seven of 11 exemptees interviewed felt that they had been harassed after entering the program. During the first rehabilitation session for a battalion, specific examples of harassment were cited to the battalion chaplain and exemption officer. Exemptees were being subjected to personal confrontations and name calling by officers and staff noncommissioned officers. They were called "freaks," "hippies," "ladies," "flower children," and "pill poppers."

A staff noncommissioned officer placed the names of exemptees on a bulletin board in the company office for everyone to see. He also said a letter was going to be sent home to their parents informing them that their sons were members of a drug program.

Generally, exemptees were taken off their regular job and given odd jobs, such as running errands, cutting grass, and pulling weeds. Some exemptees alleged that they were constantly watched by superiors trying to catch them doing something wrong.

One of the major points expressed by several exemptees was the undue notoriety they were receiving from participating in the program. Their friends tended to stay away from them because they feared the Exemption Program was a "hot bed" for informers.

There was much discussion in company offices concerning the drug users who volunteered for the program. Although the program stressed anonymity and privileged information to minimize unfavorable biases or opinions of a person's job or duty performance, company office personnel often discussed or ridiculed--within easy hearing of all personnel--the drug users who volunteered for the program.

Resources for Exemption Program and Rehabilitation Program

We were told that no resources had been received from higher commands, rather, funds and personnel necessary to administer the Exemption and Rehabilitation Programs were provided from in-house resources. Reliable estimates on the cost of operating the Exemption and Rehabilitation Programs were not readily available.

Pay and entitlement practices for drug abusers

Officials questioned stated that all classes of drug users--volunteers under the Exemption Program, personnel identified through urinalysis testing, and persons identified through law enforcement efforts--received basic pay. The only way a person would forfeit pay would be as a result of judicial and punitive action.

OBSERVATIONS

DAEIS, formed by the 3d Marine Division in January 1971, developed a comprehensive drug education program which included lectures, command briefings, posters, and the use of various news media, radio, and television to disseminate information on drug abuse. Teaching materials and methods had been developed by individual lecturers on the basis of information gathered in their day-to-day association with the drug problem and personal study. However, there was a lack of knowledge on the extent and nature of the drug abuse

problem. Unless there is a good definition of the problem, moneys spent on the educational program may be misdirected and the educational effort may be unresponsive to the need. Educational efforts had been made with the use of existing resources.

The Exemption Program had been used by some persons as a means to get out of the service. Three of 11 program volunteers admitted that they wanted to be discharged. Adverse actions could take place if personnel volunteered for the program. Some persons stated that many marines were waiting to see what happened to those who had entered the program before they made their own decision to utilize the Exemption Program. Consequently, drug users may continue to be identified principally through police investigations and through urinalysis testing.

Rehabilitation efforts at the local command level were experiencing difficulty because of lack of (1) medical and psychiatric personnel, (2) trained rehabilitative personnel, and (3) adequate facilities. Rehabilitation that was undertaken was nonclinical and was conducted at the unit level, except in those cases where medical evacuation was necessary. Exemption personnel interviewed believed that the treatment and the rehabilitation received under the program were less than adequate and consequently felt that the program was a letdown.

Law enforcement efforts were expected by some to deter the drug experimenter or the nonuser. Many persons, however, felt that these efforts had decreased the supply of marijuana and had caused marijuana users to switch to harder, more dangerous drugs, primarily heroin.

The urinalysis-testing program for identifying drug users was started August 15, 1971. Statistics available during our review showed that only four of 1,613 persons tested were found to be drug users.

All cases of drug users--volunteers under the Exemption Program, personnel identified through urinalysis testing, and persons identified through law enforcement efforts--were receiving basic pay. Pay was being forfeited only as a result of judicial or punitive action. The same pay and allowance entitlement criteria were applied to both alcoholics and drug abusers.

ORGANIZATIONS VISITED ON OKINAWA

JULY THROUGH OCTOBER 1971

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>
AIR FORCE·	
313th Air Division	Kadena Air Base
6135th Air Base Group	Naha Air Base
ARMY:	
Directorate for Personnel and Administration	Fort Buckner
MARINES:	
3d Marine Division	Camp Courtney
Marine Corps Base	Camp Butler

APPENDIX II

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.		
Melvin R. Laird	Jan. 1969	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Roger T. Kelley	Feb 1969	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT) (note a):		
Dr Richard S Wilbur	Aug. 1971	Present
Dr. Louis H Roussetot	Jan 1968	July 1971
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE).		
Brig. Gen John K. Singlaub	Sept. 1971	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Robert F Froehlke	July 1971	Present
Stanley R. Resor	July 1965	June 1971
THE SURGEON GENERAL.		
Lt Gen H B Jennings, Jr	Oct 1969	Present

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (continued)OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
PERSONNEL (DIRECTOR OF DISCIPLINE AND DRUG POLICIES):

Brig Gen Robert G Gard, Jr	May 1971	Present
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY·

John W Warner	May 1972	Present
John H Chafee	Jan 1969	May 1972

SURGEON GENERAL OF THE NAVY·

Vice Adm George M Davis	Feb 1969	Present
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATION (HUMAN RELATIONS
PROJECT MANAGER):

Rear Adm C F Rauch, Jr	Apr 1971	Present
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MARINE CORPS, U S HEADQUARTERS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF G-1

Brig Gen. R B Carney	May 1970	Present
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Robert C. Seamans, Jr	Jan. 1969	Present
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SURGEON GENERAL·

Lt Gen Alonzo A Towner	May 1970	Present
Lt Gen K. E Pletcher	Dec 1967	Apr 1970

Tenure of Office
From To

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (continued)

OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
 PERSONNEL (DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
 PLANS):

Maj Gen J W Roberts	Jan 1971	Present
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^aThis position was formerly entitled "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)" under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) The change was effective in June 1970 Dr Rousselot occupied the position under both titles.

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